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Abstract
The notion of entropy penetrates much of science. A key feature
of the all-important notion of Boltzmann-Gibbs-Shannon entropy is its
extensivity (additivity over independent subsystems). However, there
is a need for other quantities. In statistical physics a parameterized
family of non-extensive entropy measures, now mainly known under
the name of Tsallis-entropies, have received much attention but also
been met with criticism due mainly to a lack of convincing interpre-
tations.
Based on the hypothesis that interaction between truth, held by
“Nature”, and belief, as expressed by man, may take place, classical- as
well as non-classical measures of entropy and other essential quantities
are derived. The approach aims at providing a genuine interpretation,
rather than relying either on analogies based on formal mathemati-
cal manipulations or else – more fruitfully, but not satisfactory – on
axiomatic characterizations.
1 Contemplation
Let us apply a philosophical approach and put ourselves in the shoes of
the physicist, planning to set-up experiments and to engage in associated
observations. He might argue as follows:
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1: As an expression of my beliefs concerning phenomena I plan to ob-
serve, I shall assign numbers in [0, 1], typically denoted by the letter y, to
events associated with the phenomena. Certain, to me unknown numbers,
likewise in [0, 1], and likewise associated with events, express the essence of
the phenomena, and do not depend on my interference. They are referred to
as truth-assignments and are, typically, denoted by the letter x.
2: Any event I may observe entails a certain effort on my part. This
effort I shall also refer to as individual complexity – “individual”, because it
is associated with each individual event I could encounter. Before setting up
experiments, I should determine the effort I am willing to or have to devote
to any event I may be faced with. This should depend only on the assigned
belief-value y, and is denoted κ(y). The function κ, defined on [0, 1] and with
values in [0,∞], I refer to as the coder. As 1 represents certainty, I insist
that κ(1) = 0. Further, I assume that κ is smooth in a technical sense, say
continuous on [0, 1] and continuously differentiable and finite valued on ]0, 1].
Finally, as I do not want to distinguish between coders that only differ by a
scalar factor, I will introduce an assumption of normalization in order to pick
out a canonical representative of the possible coders. As κ(1) = 0 and as I
do not want to assume that κ(0) is finite, I choose to impose the condition
κ′(1) = −1 for the stated purpose.
3 To determine the coder, I must know the basic characteristica of the
world I operate in. I choose to focus primarily on a concept of interaction
between truth and belief.
4 I shall model this interaction by a function pi defined on the product
set [0, 1] × [0, 1] and taking values in ] − ∞,∞]. The idea is that pi(x, y)
represents the force by which the world presents an event to me in case the
truth-assignment is x and my belief in the event is y. On the technical
side, I better assume that pi is continuous on its domain and continuously
differentiable and finite-valued on [0, 1]×]0, 1].
5 I consider the classical world to be a world of “no interaction”, i.e.
pi(x, y) = x for all (x, y). I must be prepared for other forms of interaction,
but will always assume that the interaction is sound, i.e. that pi(x, x) = x
for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Stronger conditions should be considered and in this con-
nection, it appears sensible to impose conditions of consistency: I will call
the interaction weakly consistent if
∑
i∈A
pi(xi, yi) = 1 for any finite alphabet
A and any truth-assignment x = (xi)i∈A and belief-assignment y = (yi)i∈A,
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both assumed to be probability distributions over A. If, with the same con-
ditions on x and y, it can be concluded that (pii)i∈A = (pi(xi, yi))i∈A is in
fact a probability distribution, just as x and y, I will say that pi is strongly
consistent.
6 To enable observations from the world, I must configure all available
resources such as observation- and measuring devices. The resulting con-
figuration will enable me to perform experiments, i.e. to study individual
situations from the world which have my interest.
7 Before actual observations are performed, I must identify the various
possible basic events (or pure states, as some may prefer), which I could
encounter. I shall characterize them by an index, typically i, intended to
have semantic significance. The set of possible basic events is the alphabet
pertaining to the situation, call it A. The actual naming of members of A,
the semiotic assignment, should catalyze semantic awareness and facilitate
technical handling.
8 I will apply a principle of separability and consider my total effort related
to observations from the configured situation to be the sum of individual
efforts associated with the basic events. In so doing, I must weigh each
contribution according to the force with which I will experience the associated
basic event. The total effort I also refer to as total complexity or simply
complexity and thus find that complexity is the weighted sum of individual
complexities:
Φ(x, y) =
∑
i∈A
pi(xi, yi)κ(yi) . (1)
Here, x = (xi)i∈A and y = (yi)i∈A are, respectively the truth-assignments and
the belief-assignments associated with the various basic events.
9 I will attempt to minimize complexity and shall appeal to the principle
that the smallest value for complexity is obtained when belief matches truth.
As ∑
i∈A
pi(xi, yi)κ(yi)−
∑
i∈A
xiκ(xi) (2)
represents my frustration, the principle says that frustration is the least, in
fact disappears, when yi = xi for all i ∈ A.
Given x = (xi)i∈A, minimal complexity is what I will aim at. It is an
important quantity. In anticipation, I will call it entropy and denote it by
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the letter H1:
H(x) = inf
y=(yi)i∈A
Φ(x, y) =
∑
i∈A
xiκ(xi) . (3)
The quantity (2) too appears important. It is tempting to call it “frustration”
but, again in anticipation, I better call it divergence. I shall denote it by the
letter D:
D(x, y) = Φ(x, y)− H(x) . (4)
2 Conclusion
Theorem 1. With assumptions and definitions as introduced above, assum-
ing only that the interaction is weakly consistent, the number q = pi(1, 0) must
be non-negative and, to each q ∈ [0,∞[, there is only one pair of interaction
and coder which fulfill the conditions imposed. These functions, denoted piq
and κq, are determined by the formulas
piq(x, y) = qx+ (1− q)y , (5)
κq(y) = lnq
1
y
, (6)
where the q-logarithm is given by
lnq x =
{
ln x if q = 1,
x1−q−1
1−q
if q 6= 1 .
(7)
Note that strong consistency holds if and only if 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.
The accompanying quantities, complexity, entropy and divergence are
denoted Φq, Hq and Dq, respectively, and given through (1), (3) and (4), i.e.
Φq(x, y) =
∑
i∈A
piq(xi, yi)κq(yi) , (8)
Hq(x) =
∑
i∈A
xiκq(xi) (9)
Dq(x, y) =
∑
i∈A
(
piq(xi, yi)κq(yi)− xiκq(xi)
)
. (10)
1In order to allow a singular case – the case q = 0 of Theorem 1 below – to fit into the
framework, the infimum in (3) should be restricted to run over probability distributions y
with a support which contains the support of x.
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In (9) we recognize the family of Tsallis entropies, cf. Tsallis [6].
Regarding the proof of Theorem 1, we shall here only give a brief in-
dication: The formula (5) is readily derived from the assumption of weak
consistency. Then, the only possible form for the coder, (6), is derived from
pretty standard variational arguments. The final step of the proof, that with
(5) and (6) the variational principle does indeed hold, follows by observing
the close tie to entropy- and divergence- measures as derived by an approach
due to Bregman, cf. the recent papers [5] and [4] and references there.
3 Hints to the literature
Regarding the formula (9) for entropy and its significance, we note that it
first appeared in the mathematical literature in Havrda and Charva´t [1], that
it then appeared in the physical literature in Lindhard and Nielsen [3], and in
Lindhard [2], and that it was efficiently promoted in the paper by Tsallis [6]
which triggered much research in the physical community as also witnessed
by the many entries in the database pointed to under [6].
4 Formal publication
The present manuscript, posted on the arXiv server, is an announcement,
prior to formal publication. A manuscript with a comprehensive discussion,
with a full proof of Theorem 1 and with some further results will be worked
out soon and submitted to the electronic journal “Entropy”.
Further discussion of the considerations presented as well as suggestions
of concrete mechanisms behind the concept of interaction are among obvious
issues to look closer into.
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